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ABSTRACT
This study theoretically and empirically investigated the movements 
in the effective exchange rate indices (ERIs) of six less developed 
countries (LDCs) during the period of generalized floating of major 
currencies. Given the objective of stabilizing the ERI, four exchange 
rate arrangements were considered. First, a policy of continuing to fix 
the value of the domestic currency to the U.S. dollar. Second, a policy 
of stabilizing the LDC's ERI by changing the value of the domestic cur­
rency vis-a-vis the dollar. Third, pegging the domestic currency to the 
Special Drawing Right (SDR) basket of currencies. Fourth, stabilizing the 
ERI under an SDR peg.
Each of these arrangements requires the use of foreign exchange 
reserves in order to manage the value of the domestic currency with 
respect to the dollar. The extent of dollar reserves depends on the 
difference between the exchange value of the currency under each arrange­
ment and the market exchange rate that would prevail if the LDC allowed 
its currency to fluctuate freely. The assumption is that the larger the 
difference between the two rates, the larger the amount of reserve 
required.
The results of the study indicated that all six countries experi­
enced movements in their ERIs, during the period of generalized floating. 
These movements could have been reduced had these LDCs pegged their 
currencies to the SDR. This confirmed the hypothesis that countries
v
with a diversified trade pattern can reduce the instability in their ERI 
by switching from a single currency peg to a basket peg.
In terms of the use of reserves, the results indicated no signifi­
cant difference between the exchange rates that would emerge under the 
four exchange rate arrangements and the exchange rate that would result 
under a policy independent floating. This implied that no particular 
arrangement could be selected as the one requiring the least amount of 
reserves.
I. INTRODUCTION
The establishment of the present regime of floating exchange 
rates of major currencies, which began in March 1973, has created a 
number of policy options for the less developed countries (LDCs). 
Should LDCs allow their currencies to fluctuate due to market forces, 
or should they fix the value of their currencies to some major cur­
rency, such as the dollar, or a basket of currencies, such as the 
Special Drawing Right (SDR) basket issued by the International 
Monetary Fund?
Where the LDC's trade and financial relations are highly 
concentrated with one developed country, pegging the currency value to 
that of the developed country ensures the stability of its own domes­
tic currency in terms of the goods and services traded with the 
developed country. On the other hand, where the LDC's trading and 
financial arrangements are more diversified, pegging to the currency 
of one developed country, which is itself floating against the cur­
rencies of other developed countries, will exert an indirect impact on 
the effective exchange rate of the LDC. Exchange rate movements which 
might be appropriate with respect to one trading partner may be 
inappropriate with respect to others, and the result may be that the 
LDC will experience variations in its effective exchange rate which 
have little to do with its own balance of payments position, but 
instead reflect disequilibria between trading partners. This could
2imply a need for more reserves in the LDC involved if movements in the 
intervention currency vis-a-vis other currencies are inappropriate 
from the viewpoint of the LDC.
An alternative policy designed to reduce these problems is to 
peg the currency to a group or basket of currencies. The basket would 
incorporate those currencies in which the LDC conducts most of its 
trade. An LDC's exchange rate would not then move exactly in line
with one currency, but would move in relation to a weighted average of 
movements in a number of currencies. The idea behind the adoption of 
a weighted basket is to minimize the detrimental effects of exogenous 
exchange rate variations and to reduce the need for reserves.
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the experi­
ence of six LDCs that have pegged their currencies to the U.S. dollar 
throughout the period of generalized floating and to examine and 
compare their experience under the assumption that they had pegged
their currencies to the SDR.
The first section of the study is devoted to the introduction
and examination of the concept of the effective exchange rate. 
Through the use of examples, it explains the construction of the 
effective exchange rate index and illustrates how exogenous exchange 
rate changes can influence the index. Next, it investigates the ways 
in which the index can be stabilized under the two pegging 
arrangements.
Having provided the framework for the empirical part of the 
paper, the second section is devoted to the construction of effective 
exchange rate indices for each LDC. This is followed by measuring the 
movements in the indices during the period in which these LDCs pegged
3their currencies to the dollar. Next, the same methodology is fol­
lowed to determine the movements in the indices under the assumption 
that these countries had pegged their currencies to the SDR.
The third part of the dissertation is aimed at comparing the 
amount of reserves that would be required under the two pegging 
arrangements and under the policies designed to stabilize the effec­
tive exchange rate. The study is completed with a brief summary and 
conclusion.
II. THE CONCEPT OF THE EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE 
For almost thirty years following the Bretton Woods conference 
world currencies were maintained at fixed ratios to one another. A 
country's exchange rate was usually expressed in terms of the U.S. 
dollar, and each central bank maintained the value of its currency in 
terms of the dollar by standing ready to buy and sell unlimited 
quantities of dollars at fixed buying and selling rates. It was 
through such transactions in the market that all exchange rates were 
kept fixed, with the dollar serving as the intervention currency as 
well as a common denominator and a standard of value.
Under the present currency arrangements, the European and 
Japanese currencies are no longer fixed to the dollar. That makes the 
dollar a fluctuating currency, although it still retains its reference 
role for exchange rates. Countries measure their exchange rate 
fluctuations vis-a-vis the dollar, and often use dollars to intervene 
in the market to affect these fluctuations.
Because the major world currencies are floating independently, 
it is difficult to determine by direct inspection the net impact on a 
country's exchange rate. For example, suppose there are only three 
currencies in the world: the dollar, the mark, and the pound. Assume
that the dollar depreciated ten percent relative to the pound, and 
appreciated twenty percent relative to the mark. Then the change in 
the external value of the dollar is some weighted average of the two 
changes.
5Since in effect the dollar may change in varying degrees 
against any number of individually floating currencies, a weighted 
average of all the bilateral changes is required to determine the 
change in the exchange value of the dollar. Such an average or 
measure is called the dollar's effective exchange rate.* In calculat­
ing an effective exchange rate index, a weight representing the 
comparative importance to the home economy of each foreign country is 
applied to the value, relative to a chosen base period, of the 
exchange rate between the foreign currency in question and the home 
currency.
Several types of such an index are calculated and published for
2
the currencies of the major industrial nations. These indices may 
differ with regard to a) the base period of the index; b) the cur­
rencies included; c) the weights used in averaging the changes in the 
value of the currencies and d) the type of averaging formula used.
The base date generally chosen is March 1973, the beginning of 
the period of generalized floating, and the currencies included in 
each index are usually the currencies of the country's major trading 
partners.
See, "Movements of Effective Changes in Exchange Rates," 
Economic Report of the President, Government Printing Office, 1974, 
pp. 220-226. See also, Fred Hirsch and Use Higgins, "An Indicator of 
Effective Exchange Rates," IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 17, November 1970, 
pp. 453-487.
2
For a detailed analysis of these indices see Rudolf Rhomberg, 
"Indices of Effective Exchange Rates," IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 23, 
March 1976, pp. 88-112.
6Several possible weights can be used in calculating the changes 
in the exchange rates. The weights employed depend on the purpose for 
which the index is developed. An import-weighted index, where each 
partner country’s share in the home country’s imports is used as a 
weight, measures the effect of exchange rate changes on the cost of 
imports into the home country. Likewise, an export-weighted index, 
where each country’s share in the home country's exports is used as a 
weight, measures average changes in the cost of the home country's 
exports to foreigners. A third alternative is to weight each partner 
country by the sum of the home country's exports to and imports from 
that country, while a fourth possibility is a global trade-weighted 
index, where each partner country's weight is equal to its share in 
worldwide trade. These four types of indices are published, 
respectively, by the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, the U.S. Treasury 
Department, the Federal Reserve Board, and Reuters.
None of the above indices is designed to assess the effect of 
exchange rate changes on the country's trade balance. For bilateral 
trade weights take into account only the size of the trade flows 
between two countries while the trade balance effect must also depend 
on the responsiveness of trade flows to changes in the exchange rates. 
In order to provide a guide to the effect of currency fluctuations on 
trade balances, the IMF developed the Multilateral Exchange Rate Model 
(MERM) from which the weights for the IMF indices of effective ex­
change rates are obtained. Each weight represents the model's esti­
mate of how the trade balance of the country in question will be 
affected by a one percent change in the domestic currency price of one
73
of the other trade partner's currencies. The IMF currently calcu­
lates effective exchange rate indices for the currencies of sixteen 
industrialized nations.
Given the amount of data required for the construction of the 
MERM index, and given that such data are not available for most LDCs, 
it is necessary to consider simpler indices, which can be computed
from available data, and which take into account some of the con-
4
ditions in the foreign exchange market. For most LDCs an import-
weighted index provides the closest approximation to the effective
exchange rate index.^
To illustrate the concept of the effective exchange rate index,
consider a developing country such as Egypt, that by assumption,
conducts half of her trade (e.g., imports) with the United States and
the other half with Germany. The effective exchange rate of the
Egyptian pound can be expressed as:
(1) ER = (R )Wus • (R, )Wdm usp dmp
where:
ER = Effective exchange rate of the Egyptian pound.
3
The MERM model is described in Jacques Artus and Rudolf 
Rhomberg, "A Multilateral Exchange Rate Model," IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 
20, November 1973, pp. 591-611. A less rigorous explanation is 
provided in IMF Survey, February 8, 1982, pp. 37-39.
^See, for example, Gerard Belanger, "An Indicator of Effective 
Exchange Rates for Primary Producing Contries," IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 
26, March 1978, pp. 113-136.
^The rationale for the use of an import-weighted approach to 
the estimation of changes in the effective exchange rates of LDCs is 
given by Andrew Crockett and Saleh Nsouli, "Exchange Rate Policies for 
Developing Countries," Journal of Envelopment Studies, Vol. 17, 
January 1977, pp. 125-143.
8R = dollar-pound exchange rate expressed as dollars ($)
us  ^ per Egyptian pound (EP), that is ($/EP).
R, = mark-pound exchange rate expressed as marks (DM) per
mP Egyptian pound, that is (DM/EP).
Wu = weights of the dollar and the mark respectively,
based on their trade shares, W =W, =0.5.
us dm
Like a price index the effective exchange rate cannot be 
expressed in absolute terms and has no significance at any point in 
time. Over time, however, the effective exchange rate can change if 
there are changes in the exchange rates of the home country with 
respect to the currencies of the trading partners. In our example, 
this would mean changes in Rugp and/or changes in R^ • The change in 
]*usp can be due to changes in trade between the U.S. and Egypt. The 
change in R^ can be due to changes in trade between Egypt and 
Germany, as well as due to changes in the exchange rate between the 
dollar and the mark.
To illustrate this point, let R* be the exchange rate between 
the dollar and the mark, expressed as marks per dollar,
(2 ) R* = (DM/$)
rewriting (2) yields,
(3) R* = (DM/EP)/($/EP)
recalling the expressions for R and R, , we haveusp dmp
(4) R* = (R^J/CR )dmp usp
and
(5) R = (R ) • (R*)dmp usp
To observe the changes in the effective exchange rate, in period one
let: R =2.5 R* = 2.0 and W = W, =0.5, then by equation (5)
usp us dm
9^dmp = Substituting equation (5) into equation (1) yields the
effective exchange rate ER^.
ER1 = (2.5)0'5 • (5.0)°‘5 = 3.5355
Let us assume that in the second period there is a depreciation in the
value of the mark relative to the dollar, that is R* changes from 2.0
marks per dollar to 4.0 marks per dollar. Given an unchanged value
for the dollar-pound rate (RUSp = 2.5), then currency arbitrage will
cause a change in the mark-pound rate (R^p = 10.0), such that there
are no unexploited profit opportunities.^ Consequently in period two:
R = 2.5, R* = 4.0, then R, = 10.0 andusp dmp
ER2 = (2.5)°*5 • (10.0)0,5 = 4.9999 
Letting the initial period serve as the base period, the change in the 
effective exchange rate index (ERI) can be expressed as;
ERI: = 100 • (ER1)/(ER1) = 100.00
ERI2 = 100 • (ER2)/(ER2) = 100 • (4.999)/(3.5355) = 141.42
Thus, while the value of the pound with respect to the dollar did not 
change, the effective exchange rate of the pound changed because the 
value of the dollar vis-a-vis the mark changed. Table 1 shows
Under these circumstances, arbitrageurs will sell one pound 
and receive 2.5 dollars. They will then exchange the dollars for ten 
marks at the new mark-dollar exchange rate of four marks per dollar. 
They in turn exchange the ten marks for two pounds. The result of 
these transactions is an excess demand for pounds in terms of marks 
which will drive up the price of pounds vis-a-vis the mark to ten 
marks per pound.
10
illustrative movements in the effective rate index of the pound
ten periods, given a iconstant R and ausp changing R*.
TABLE 1
Changes in the Effective Exchange Rate Index (ERI)
Period R 1 R* ER
2
ERIusp dmp
1 2.50 2.00 5.00 3.5355 100.00
2 2.50 4.00 10.00 4.9999 141.42
3 2.50 3.00 7.50 4.3301 122.47
4 2.50 3.50 8.75 4.5391 128.38
5 2.50 3.25 8.125 4.5069 127.47
6 2.50 4.50 11.25 5.3032 149.99
7 2.50 5.00 12.50 5.5901 158.11
8 2.50 6.00 15.00 6.1237 173.20
9 2.50 5.50 13.75 5.8630 165.83
10 2.50 2.50 6.25 3.9522 111.78
1mean =
2mean =
2.5, standard deviation = 0.
137.86, standard deviation = 22.69, significant at 95 perc(
level
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the problem that 
many LDCs face with the present system of fluctuating exchange rates. 
While many LDCs continue to peg their currencies to the dollar, they 
have experienced fluctuations in their effective exchange rates as a
11
result of fluctuations in the value of the dollar with respect to
other major currencies.^
The concern with exchange rate variability stems in almost all
cases from its impact on the domestic currency value of international
transactions, for the most part the prices of exports and imports.
Exchange rates translate the foreign or world price of goods into the
domestic price of imports. Assuming no variability in the world price
of goods, then the variability in the domestic price of imports will
be the result of variability in exchange rates. If the objective is
to reduce the variability in the domestic price of imports, that is
reducing the uncertainty in import prices, then the strategic variable
to consider is not the nominal exchange rate (i.e., R ), but rather
usp
the effective exchange rate. To reduce the variability or uncertainty
in average import prices, efforts must be made to stabilize the
0
effective exchange rate.
To reduce the fluctuations in the effective exchange rate, we
have to determine the causes of the changes in the rate. Let us
transform equations (1) and (5) into natural logarithms:
(6) In ER = (W )(ln R ) + (W, ) (In R_, )
us usp dm dmp
(7) In R, = In R + In R* dmp usp
^Evidence of fluctuations in the ERIs of LDCs is reported by 
the IMF in IMF World Economic Outlook, 1982, pp. 121-126.
0
For a formal analysis of the impact of floating exchange rates 
on the domestic price of imports see Stanley Black, "Exchange Rate 
Policies for Less Developed Countries in a World of Floating Rates," 
Princeton Essays in International Finance, No. 119, December 1976, pp. 
1-43.
12
Equation (6 ) states that given weights and , changes in ER (In
ER) are the results of changes in R and/or changes in R, , while
usp dmp
equation (7) states that changes in are the result of changes in
R and/or changes in R*. Since by assumption W + W. =1. then usp ° J r us dm
(8) W, = 1 - W
dm us
Substituting equations (7) and (8) into equation (6) yields:
(9) In ER = (W ) (In R ) + (1 - W ) (In R + In R*)us usp us usp
(10) In ER = In R + (1 - W ) (In R*)
usp us
According to equation (.10), changes in ER are then caused by changes
in R and/or changes in R*. Note that while changes in R are 
usp “ usp
policy determined, changes in R* are determined exogenously and are 
beyond the control of the monetary authorities. This means that the 
type of exchange rate arrangement that a country peruses also influ­
ences the effective exchange rate and becomes important when dealing
9
with alternative policies to stabilize the effective exchange rate.
If changes in the effective rate are caused by changes in the
dollar-pound rate (RUSp)» t^en stabilizing the effective rate will
involve measures that will fix the value of R . If, on the other
usp
hand, the changes in the effective rate are due to changes in R*, then
in order to keep the effective rate from changing, R would have to
usp
be changed in an opposite and offsetting direction.
For example, in the second period, R* changed from two to four 
marks per dollar representing a 100 percent change or depreciation of
9
This is based on a similar study by Romeo Bautista, "Exchange 
Rate Variations and Export Competitiveness in Less Developed Countries 
under Generalized Floating," Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 18, 
april 1982, pp. 354-378.
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the mark. However, this percentage change is weighted; with W^s =0.5 
the effective percentage change in the effective rate is equal to 
fifty percent. To keep the effective rate (ER) from changing, that is 
setting the change in ER equal to zero, it will be necessary to change 
the value of the dollar with respect to the pound by 50 percent. This 
means we have to change Rugp from $2.5 to $1.25, a 50 percent 
appreciation of the pound, with respect to the dollar.
Note that while we can influence R directly, it will not be
usp
possible to change R*, because that rate is determined exogenously in 
the foreign exchange market. Since we assumed that Egypt has fixed 
the value of Rugp> then with constant weights, changes in her effec­
tive rate are necessarily the result of changes in R*. However, to 
offset these exogenous changes in R* and to stabilize the ER, Egypt
must adjust the value of Rugp* This presents a dilemma. Egypt can
either stabilize the ER or Rugp but not both, given the exogenous
changes in R*.
This point is illustrated in Table 2, which makes use of the 
same assumptions regarding exogenous changes in R* as does Table 1. 
However, in Table 2 we assume that the goal is to stabilize the
effective rate ER rather than ^ ugp* Referring to Table 2, to keep
the value of ER constant from the first period to the second period,
^usp must changed from $2.5 to $1.25 per pound. Similarly, given a 
change in R* from two to three marks per dollar (i.e., change in R* in
the third period), the value of Rugp must be changed from $2.5 to
$1.6 6 , or a thirty-three percent appreciation of the pound.
TABLE 2
Changes in R under a Stable Effective Rate usp
Period R 1 usp R* dmp ER
2
ERI
1 1.50 2 . 0 0 5.00 3.5355 100.00
2 2.15 4.00 10 .00 3.5355 10 0 .00
3 1 .6 6 3.00 7.50 3.5355 100 .00
4 1.43 3.50 8.75 3.5355 100 .00
5 1.53 3.25 8.125 3.5355 100 .00
6 1.11 4.50 11.25 3.5355 100 .00
7 1 .0 0 5.00 12.50 3.5355 100.00
8 0.83 6 . 0 0 15.00 3.5355 100 .00
9 0.90 5.50 13.75 3.5355 100 .00
10 2 . 0 0 2.50 6.25 3.5355 1 00 .0 0
'''Mean = 1.41, standard deviation = 0.45. Significant at 95% level
2
Mean = 100, standard deviation = 0.
The importance of these exogenous changes in R* depend on the
weight attached to them. Thus, the larger the weight attached to
changes in R*, the larger the influence of those changes on the
changes in ER. On the other hand, if the weight attached to R is
usp
relatively large, then changes in R* will have a marginal effect on 
changes in ER. In our example we assumed that half of Egypt's imports 
were from the U.S. and the other half from Germany, thus assigning 
equal weights to the dollar and the mark. If the majority of Egypt's 
imports came from the U.S. then the dollar would receive a relatively 
larger weight which would mean that changes in Rugp will have a larger 
influence on changes in ER, or to state it differently, changes in R*
15
will have a smaller influence on changes in ER (see equation (10)). 
On the other hand, if the majority of Egypt's imports came from 
Germany, then changes in R* will have the relatively stronger 
influence on changes in ER.
If the objective is to stabilize the ER, this implies that 
larger changes in ^USp will be necessary to prevent the ER from 
changing. To avoid or prevent these relatively larger changes in RUSp 
and the instability in the ER, Egypt can seek another exchange rate 
arrangement that incorporates these exogenous changes in R*. One such 
arrangement is to fix the value of the pound to both the mark and the 
dollar. This is commonly referred to as fixing the value of the 
currency to a basket of currencies.
An alternative pegging arrangement designed to stabilize the 
effective exchange rate of a currency is to fix the value of the 
currency to a basket of currencies, such as the Special Drawing Right 
(SDR).
For illustrative purposes, let us construct a simple hypothet­
ical SDR basket composed of two currencies. The value of the SDR is 
equal to the sum of the fixed components of each of these currencies 
in the basket. The value of the SDR in terms of any single currency 
is then the value of the currency components in the basket expressed 
in terms of a single currency at the prevailing spot exchange rate.
Let the two currencies in the basket be the dollar and the 
mark, with the percentage weight of 0.5 assigned to each currency, and 
the prevailing spot exchange rate between the currencies be 2 marks = 
1 dollar. Then
SDR 1 = (0.5)($1) + (0.5)(DM 2)
16
SDR 1 = 0.5 $ + 1.0 DM 
The currency components for the dollar and the mark are 0.5 and 1.0, 
respectively. To express the value of the SDR in terms of the dollar, 
we multiply the currency component of the mark with the prevailing 
mark-dollar exchange rate:
SDR 1 = 0.5 $ + (1.0 DM)(0.5 $/DM)
SDR 1 = 1 $
Given that SDR1 = $1, we can now find the value of the Egyptian pound 
in terms of the SDR. Since one EP = $2.5, then one EP = SDR 2.5. This 
is the value that the authorities will intend to maintain with respect 
to the SDR.
The value of the SDR will change following changes in the value 
of the currencies in the basket. Following our example, in the second 
period, the mark-Egyptian pound rate changed from two to four marks 
per dollar. Given our fixed currency components of 0.5 for the dollar 
and 1.0 for the mark, the value of the SDR with respect to the dollar
will change to SDR 1 = $0.75, that is:
SDR 1 = 0.5 $ + (1.0 DM)(0.25 $/DM)
As a result of this change in the value of the SDR-dollar value, the
value of the SDR with respect to the pound will change to one Egyptian 
pound being equal to 3.3 SDRs. To prevent the change in the value of 
the pound with respect to the SDR, the authorities would have to allow 
the value of the pound with respect to the dollar and the mark to 
change.
Let
Rg(jr = dollars per SDR ^Usp = ^°^^ars Per Egyptian pound
Rsdrp= SDRs per Egyptian pound
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R* = marks per dollar d^inp = mar^s Per Egyptian pound
then
R . = (R )/(R . )sdrp usp sdr
in our example Rgcjrp = 2.5, and Rg£jr = 0.75. Following the change in
R*, then
R = (R . ) • (R )usp sdrp sdr
Since,
R = (2.5) • (0.75) - $1,875 usp
R, = (R ) • (R*) dmp usp
Rdmp = (1*875) ‘ (4*°) = DM 7 - 5
Therefore, in order to keep the value of R , at 2.5, the values of
sdrp
Rusp an(^  Rdmp wou -^8 have to change to $1,875 and DM 7.5, respectively.
These changes in Rugp and R^p will in turn change the effective
exchange rate of the pound. The effective rate in the second period
will now equal to 3.7499.
ER„ = (R )V\xs • (R, )Wdm 2 usp dmp
ER2 = (1.875)0'5 • (7.5) ° ‘ 5 = 3.7499
Table 3 illustrates changes in R and R, , and movements in
usp dmp
the effective exchange rate index, that are necessary to keep the
value of the pound with respect to the SDR fixed at R , =2.5.
sdrp
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TABLE 3
Changes in ERI under an SDR Peg
Period R 1 usp sdr R , 2 sdrp R* dmp ER
3
ERI
1 1.500 1 .0 0 2.5 2 . 0 0 5.00 3.5355 100 .00
2 1.875 0.75 2.5 4.00 7.50 3.7499 106.06
3 2.083 0.83 2.5 3.00 6.25 3.6080 102.05
4 1.964 0.78 2.5 3.50 6.87 3.6731 103.89
5 2.019 0.81 2.5 3.25 6.56 3.6392 102.93
6 1.805 0172 2.5 4.50 8 . 1 2 3.8283 108.28
7 1.750 0.70 2.5 5.00 8.75 3.9129 110.67
8 1.667 0 . 6 6 2.5 6 . 0 0 9.96 4.0746 115.25
9 1.704 0 . 6 8 2.5 5.50 9.37 3.9955 113.01
10 2.25 0.90 2.5 2.50 5.67 3.5575 100.67
2Mean = 1.86, standard deviation = 0.22. Significant at 95% level. 
„Mean = 2.5, standard deviation = 0.
Mean = 106128, standard deviation = 5.04. Significant at 95% level. 
We can observe that there are movements in the ERI under an SDR 
pegging arrangement, similar to the movements under the dollar pegging 
arrangement (See Table 1).
A comparison of Tables 1 and 3 reflects that the size of the 
movements in the ERI under the SDR peg is smaller than under the 
dollar peg. The mean and standard deviation of the ERI under the 
dollar peg were 137.86 and 22.69, respectively, while the mean and 
standard deviation of the ERI under the SDR peg were 106.28 and 5.04,
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respectively. Thus by pegging to a basket of currencies, Egypt may be
able to reduce the fluctuations in her ERI.*®
To stabilize the ERI under the SDR peg, the authorities will
have to make similar adjustments In R as under the dollar-pee.
usp r 6
Similar calculations have been made to show the changes in R that
usp
would be necessary to keep the ERI constant, and they are presented in
Table 4. This allows us to compare the changes in R that usp would be
required to keep the ERI constant under alternative pegging arrangemer
TABLE 4
Changes in R under usp an SDR Peg and a Stable ER
Period R 1 usp sdr R , sdrp R* dmp ER
3
ERI
1 2.50 2 . 0 0 2.5 2 . 0 0 5.00 3.5355 100 .00
2 1 .6 6 0.75 2.5 4.00 7.50 3.5355 100 .00
3 1.99 0.83 2.5 3.00 6.25 3.5355 100 .0 0
4 1.82 0.78 2.5 3.50 6.87 3.5355 100 .00
5 1.90 0.81 2.5 3.25 6.56 3.5355 10 0 .0 0
6 1.54 0.72 2.5 4.50 8 . 1 2 3.5355 100 .0 0
7 1.43 0.70 2.5 5.00 8.75 3.5355 1 0 0 .00
8 1.25 0 . 6 6 2.5 6 . 0 0 9.96 3.5355 100 .00
9 1.33 0 . 6 8 2.5 5.50 9.37 3.5355 100.00
10 2 .2 2 0.90 2.5 2.50 5.62 3.5355 100 .00
^Mean = 1.76, standard deviation = 0.40. Significant at 95% level. 
^Mean = 2.5, standard deviation = 0.
Mean = 100, standard deviation = 0.
The differences between the means and standard deviations of 
ERI under the two policies were significant at the 95 percent level.
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Bated on our example, we are able to demonstrate the Impact of 
exogenous exchange rates on the effective exchange rate of the
Egyptian pound. Through the construction of a simple index, we
observed that there were significant movements in the index when there 
were changes in the exchange rate of the dollar and the mark, even 
though the value of the Egyptian pound was fixed to the value of the 
dollar. The movements in the ERI could be reduced if Egypt pegged the 
pound to both the dollar and the mark, that is to a basket of cur­
rencies which we called the SDR. This implied that the standard to 
which a currency is pegged, also influences the ERI, and will influ­
ence the extent to which the authorities would have to change R in
usp
order to stabilize the ERI.
We can apply the same procedure to determine a more comprehen­
sive and accurate effective exchange rate index for an LDC and to 
observe the movements in the index when there are changes in the
values of major currencies. If the LDC has pegged its currency to the 
dollar, then we can compare the actual movements in its ERI with the 
hypothetical movements in its ERI under the assumption that its
currency is pegged to the SDR.
The next section is concerned with an empirical investigation 
of the movements in the ERIs of six LDCs that maintained a dollar peg 
throughout the period of generalized floating of major currencies. In 
addition, a comparison of those actual movements with the hypothetical 
changes in their ERIs (under the assumption that they maintained a peg 
to the SDR) will be made.
III. METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL STUDY
In order to illustrate the effects of the floating of major 
currencies and the type of pegging arrangements on the effective 
exchange rate index of an LDC, six countries were selected: Egypt,
Ghana, Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, and Pakistan. Each of these countries 
is small;, has a relatively open economy, and possesses a diversified 
trade pattern. A common characteristic with regard to each country's 
trade pattern is that the majority of their trade is done with the 
same group of developed countries. Each of these LDCs has pegged its 
currency to the dollar for a substantial period of time subsequent to 
the floating of the major currencies.
For each country an effective exchange rate index has been 
constructed based on the following formula:
w .
n 1
(1) ER = r (R )
i=l
(2) ERIt = 100 • (ERt)/(ERt=1) 
where:
ER^ = the value of the effective exchange rate at time t.
R - bilateral exchange rates in units of country i's currency 
per unit of the LDC's currency at time t.
= weight of country i's currency.
ERIt = The value of the effective exchange rate index at time t, 
relative to base period value of the index.
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For example, the effective exchange rate of the Egyptian pound can be 
expressed as:
(3) ER - (Kusp)"us<Rynp)“yn(Rdi]ip)"<i„(Rlbp)Wlb(1!lrp)Wlr(Rfrp)“£r
where:
R
usp = dollars per pound
R = yen per pound 
ynp
Rdmp = mar^s Per Pound
Let:
= British pounds per pound
R^rp = liras per pound 
Rfrp = francs per pound
R, = marks per dollar dm R ^  = British pounds per dollar
Rpr = liras per dollar
Rfr == francs per i
Ryn = yen per dollar
then,
R , = R 
dmp usp Rdm Rlbp = Rusp * Rlb
R, = R 
dmp usp Rdm Rilrp
= R
usp • Rlr
R = R 
ynp usp
R
yn frp = Rusp * Rfr
The effective rate can now be expressed as:
(A) ER = (R )Wus(R • R ^yn(R • R, )Wdm usp usp yn J usp dm
(R • R. )Wlr(R -R.,)Wlb(R • R. )Wfr usp lr usp lb usp fr
The currencies used in the index are the dollar, the mark, the franc, 
the yen, the British pound, and the lira. The weights assigned to 
each currency are import weights derived as the proportion of each 
country's total imports from the developed countries. The import 
values, obtained from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics 
Yearbook, are calculated by taking the average of imports for the
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years 1978, 1979, and 1980. Table 5 represents the currencies and 
their weights in the ERI of each country.
TABLE 5
__________________ Currencies and Weights in the ERI__________________
Dollar Yen Mark Franc Pound Lira
Pakistan .50 .18 .09 .06 .11 .06
Ghana .36 .06 .17 .04 .30 .07
Egypt .32 .09 .19 .15 .11 .14
Sudan .16 .10 .2 0 .12 .33 .09
Burundi .14 .20 .24 .25 . 10 .07
Somalia .13 .03 . 1 0 .05 .14 .55
The base period of the analysis is March 1973, the beginning of
the period of floating exchange rates. To calculate movements in the
ERI, monthly data on exchange rates of the major currencies ^yn’
R., , R, , R,. ) , were gathered for the period March 1973 to September 
lb lr tr
1982, from the IMF"s International Financial Statistics publication. 
The variability of the ERI is defined as the standard deviation of 
the monthly values of the ERI. The variability of ERI is presented in 
Table 6 .
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TABLE 6
Variability of the ERI 
(March 1973 - September 1982)
Standard Coefficient
Country Mean Deviation of Variation
Pakistan 100.21 4.79 4.78
Burundi 90.85 9.86 10.85
Sudan 89.85 21.54 23.97
Somalia 117.48 18.25 15.47
Egypt 85.07 22.40 26.33
Ghana 78.15 31.26 39.99
As previously explained, the variability of the ERI is, in 
part, the result of changes in the value of the dollar vis-a-vis the 
other currencies involved in a given country's trade pattern, as well 
as adjustments in the dollar value of each domestic currency. If we 
convert equation (4) into natural logarithms, changes in the effective 
rate of the Egyptian pound can be expressed as
(5) In ER = (W )(In R )+(W )(In R +ln R )+(W, )(In R +ln R, )us usp yn usp yn dm usp dm
+ (W1,)(ln R +ln R1,) + (W1 ) (In R +ln R, ) + (fcL )lb usp lb lr usp lr fr
(In R +ln R,. ) usp f r
rearranging yields:
In ER = (W +W +W, +W +W., +Wr ) (In R ) + (W ) (In R ) + 
us yn dm lb lr fr usp yn yn
V O ' l b X 1- Elb>+(Wlr>(1" Elr> + < V a ” V
since (»US+Wynt»dm*«ir+W£r) * '• then.
(6) In ER = In R +((W ) (In R ) + (W, ) (In R. ) + (W..)(ln R..)usp yn yn dm dm lb lb
25
+ (Wlr)(ln Rlr)(Wfr)(ln Rfj.)).
According to equation (6 ), changes in ER will come about through
changes in the dollar value of the domestic currency (R ) and/or
usp
changes in the value of the dollar with respect to the other cur­
rencies (i.e., changes in R , R, , R-, , R. , R, ). This means that
yn dm lb lr fr
devaluations and revaluations will exert a separate influence on the 
effective rate. Therefore, to isolate the influence of exogenous 
changes we must take these currency realignments into account.
Between March 1973,and September 1982, Egypt devalued the pound 
in January of 1979, while Ghana devalued its currency in July of 1978 
and Burundi in May of 1976. Sudan and Somalia devalued their cur­
rencies several times and Pakistan allowed her currency to float in 
January of 1982. To isolate the effect of the exogenous changes in 
major currency values, another set of ERIs were calculated using a 
different period of analysis for each country.
The period of analysis for each country started with March 1973 
and ended with the period in which each country devalued its currency 
with respect to the dollar. Thus for Burundi the period ends with 
April 1976, for Somalia with April 1982, for Sudan with May 1978, for 
Ghana with June 1978, for Egypt with December 1978, and for Pakistan 
with December 1981. The movements in the ERIs are presented in 
Appendix A and Table 7 presents the variability of the ERI for each 
country during the period in which they maintained a fixed dollar peg.
26
TABLE 7
Variability of the ERI under a Dollar Peg
Standard Coefficient of
Country Mean Deviation Variation
Burundi 100.39 3.73 3.72
Mar.73-Apr.76
Pakistan 10 0 .21 4.80 4.78
Mar.73-Dec. 81
Egypt 102.50* 4.73 4.63
Mar. 73-Dec.78
Ghana 105.15* 5.43 5.17
Mar.73-June 78
Sudan 106.62* 6.72 6.30
Mar. 73-May 78
Somalia 120.18* 15.32 12.78
Mar. 73-Apr.82
(*)Asterisk indicates significance at 95 percent level.
Having kept the value of domestic currency fixed with respect 
to the dollar, the results in Table 7 indicate that the changes in the 
exchange rates exogenous to a given country do influence the ERI and 
contribute to its variance. Standard deviations range from a low of 
3.73 for Burundi to a high of 15.32 for Somalia. As previously 
explained, the importance of these exogenous changes in R* depend on 
the weights attached to each of the currencies in the index. The 
larger the aggregate weight of Ryn» R,jm » Rib* Rlr 5 Rfr* stron8er
the influence of their changes on the variance of the ERI. (See 
equation (6 ).) A comparison of the results in Table 5 and Table 7 
confirms this relationship. Sudan and Somalia, which assign a 
relatively higher aggregate weight to the currencies other than the 
dollar (.84 and .87, respectively) have relatively higher standard 
deviations (6.72 and 15.32, respectively). On the other hand, 
Pakistan, Egypt, and Ghana, which give a relatively lower aggregate 
weight to the currencies besides the dollar (.50, .74, and .78,
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respectively) have relatively lower standard deviations (3.7, 4.8, and 
4.73, respectively). This conforms with the results of a study 
performed by Crockett and Nsouli, where it was shown that most 
Caribbean countries that pegged their currencies to the dollar 
suffered less instability in their ERIs because the United States was 
their dominant trading partner. Similarly, most francophone African 
countries which fixed their currencies to the French franc, generated 
less variance in their ERIs because France was their major trading 
partner. 11
As previously suggested, LDCs which have a diversified trade
pattern can reduce the variability of their ERIs by pegging their
12currencies to a basket of currencies such as the SDR. To see 
whether this is possible, the same methodology has been followed under 
the assumption that these LDCs fixed the value of their currencies to 
the SDR instead of the dollar.
The SDR basket is composed of five currencies with the follow­
ing weights: U.S. dollar = .42, German mark = .19, French franc = 
.13, British pound = .13, Japanese yen = .13. Under this form of
^Crockett and Nsouli, (1977).
12This is also suggested by Black (1976), and Crockett and
Nsouli (1977). In another study, F.L. Osunsade makes the same
suggestion. See F.L. Osunsade, "Generalized Floating and Problems of 
Policy Response in the Devleoping Countries," I.M.F. (DM/767/1),
January 1976, pp. 1-36, mimeographed.
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pegging arrangement the domestic value of the currencies with respect
13to the dollar changes along with changes in other currencies.
Two sets of ERIs have been calculated for each country, the 
first covering the period March 1973 to September 1982, the second 
covering the period March 1973 up to the period in which the first 
major adjustment in the domestic exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar 
took place. (See Appendix A for the movements in the ERI for the 
latter period.) Tables 8 and 9 present the variability of the ERI for 
the two periods.
The figures in Table 8 illustrate a wide range of values in the 
variance of the ERI from a low of 1.71 for Pakistan to a high of 14.82 
for Somalia. A pattern similar to the dollar peg arrangement emerges 
under this policy, that is countries that assign a relatively larger 
aggregate weight to the currencies other than the dollar, exhibit 
relatively higher standard deviations in their ERIs. A comparison of 
the results in Tables 7 and 9 tends to confirm this relationship —  
that if the LDC has a diversified trade pattern it can reduce its ERI 
variance by pegging to a basket of currencies such as the SDR. All 
the countries exhibited a lower standard deviation in their ERIs by
For a description of the valuation of SDRs and the mechanics 
of pegging to the SDR see David S. Cutler, and Dhruba Gupta, "SDRs: 
Valuation and Interest Rate," Finance and Development, Volume 11, 
September 1974, pp. 18-20, and Andrew Geraki, "Pegging to the SDR, The 
Experience of Iran, Jordan, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia," Finance and 
Development, Volume 13, March 1976, pp. 11-15.
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TABLE 8
Variability in the ERI Under an SDR Peg 
(March 73-September 82)
Mean Standard Deviation Coefficient of 
Variation
Burundi 141.38 4.96 3.51
Somalia 122.61 14.82 1 2 .1 0
Sudan 105.40 4.11 3.90
Ghana 104.27 2.83 2.72
Egypt 103.01 2.82 2.73
Pakistan 101.61 1.71 1 .6 8
Variability in
TABLE 9 
the ERI under an SDR Peg
Mean Standard Deviation Coefficient of
Variation
Burundi 99.78 2.64 2.65
Mar.73-Apr. 76
Somalia 121.24* 13.63 11.24
Mar. 73-Apr.82
Sudan 105.15* 4.57 4.39
Mar. 73-May 78
Ghana 103.88* 3.52 3.39
Mar. 73-June 78
Egypt 101.85* 2.32 2.27
Mar. 73-June 78
Pakistan 101.61* 1.71 1 .6 8
March 73-Dec. 81
(*) Asterisk indicates significance at 95% level.
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pegging to the SDR. For Burundi from 3.73 to 2.64, for Pakistan from 
4.8 to 1.71, for Egypt from 4.73 to 2.32, for Ghana form 5.43 to 3.52, 
for Sudan from 6.72 to 4.57, and from Somalia from 15.32 to 13.63.^
The results of this study are in accordance with the results 
obtained in other works. In a study performed by Stanley Black, the 
author estimated the variances of monthly data on import-weighted 
effective rates for a number of LDCs, for the periods January 1970-May 
1972, and June 1972-April 1974. He concluded that LDCs which main­
tained over-valued exchange rates and then devalued them sharply 
suffered high variances in their ERI. In addition, countries that had 
pegged their currencies to the dollar experienced a moderate increase 
in the variance of their ERI during the period of floating rates.^ 
In another study concentrating on four Latin American countries that 
pegged their currencies to the dollar, the author asserts that fluctu­
ating exchange rates contributed significantly to the variance of the 
ERI.^ A recent study carried out by the IMF in which they measured 
the annual movements in the import-weighted ERI of a number of LDCs 
over the period 1973 to 1981, concluded that "... nominal (effective) 
movements in exchange rates for many countries are influenced by 
exchange rates developments among the currencies of the major
The difference between the means and standard deviation of 
the ERIs under the two policies were tested and were significant at 95 
percent levels for all countries except Somalia.
15Stanley Black, (1976).
^Edmar Bacha, "The Impact of the Float on LDCs: Latin
American Experience in the 1970s," in John Williamson, Exchange Rate 
Rules: The Theory, Performance, and Prospects of the Crawling Peg,
St. Martin's Press, New York, New York, 1981, pp. 282-297.
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industrial countries, especially for countries that peg their 
currencies to another currency or to the SDR."^
To determine the impact of the type of pegging arrangement on 
the variance of the ERI, several other studies arrive ^  the same 
conclusions. Alexander Kafka measured the movements in the import- 
weighted ERI of a number of LDCs during three different periods: the
48 months preceding 1971; the period January 1971-June 1973; and the 
period July 1973-June 1977. By grouping the LDCs into countries that 
pegged to a major currency and countries that pegged to a basket of 
currencies, he arrived at two conclusions: a) all countries experi­
enced an increase in the variance of their ERI when the major cur­
rencies began to float; b) LDCs that pegged their currencies to a
basket of currencies experienced a smaller increase in the variance of
18their ERI than countries that were pegged to the dollar. In yet 
another study performed by Anthony Layni and Esther Suss at the IMF, 
the authors attempted to determine which pegging arrangement would 
result in the lowest variance of the ERI for a number of LDCs. Their 
results revealed that for 25 countries that were pegging to the 
dollar, an SDR peg would have resulted in lower variance in their
^I.M.F., World Economic Outlook, 1982, p. 124.
18Alexander Kafka, "The New Exchange Rate Regimes and the 
Developing Countries," Journal of Finance, Papers and Proceedings, 
Volume 33, June 1978, pp. 795-802.
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ERI. Another empirical study designed to establish whether an SDR
peg would in fact stabilize the ERI, was performed by John Williamson
for the currencies of selected Arab countries. It concluded that
the adoption of an SDR peg as opposed to a dollar peg would reduce the
20ERI instability by some one-half to two-thirds.
These results suggested that LDCs that have a relatively 
diversified trade pattern can reduce the variance in their ERIs by 
moving from a single currency peg to an SDR peg. However, the 
benefits of such an action must be weighed against the costs of 
implementing such a policy. One of these costs is the reliance on 
foreign exchange reserves to maintain the exchange value of the 
domestic currency. Intervention in the foreign exchange market, 
through the use of reserves is required under all the exchange rates 
arrangements that have been discussed. The literature on the use of 
reserves has not specifically addressed this question.
The next section of this dissertation is aimed at investigating 
the changes in the domestic exchange value of the currencies of the 
countries in the study and the resultant changes in the foreign 
exchange reserves that would be necessary to maintain the domestic 
currency value under each exchange rate arrangement.
19Anthony Lanyi and Esther Suss, "Exchange Rate Variability: 
Alternative Measures and Interpretation," IMF Staff Papers, Volume 29, 
December 1982, pp. 527-560.
20
John Williamson, "Exchange Rate Coordination and the Arab 
Dinar," Mimeographed, 1981.
IV. RESERVE USE UNDER ALTERNATIVE EXCHANGE RATE ARRANGEMENTS
The various exchange rate arrangements that have been discussed 
so far will require the use of reserves to maintain an exchange rate 
at a predetermined level. The first arrangement involves a policy of 
keeping the value of the domestic currency fixed to the dollar, which 
is achieved by means of reserves through intervention in the foreign 
exchange market. Yet it has been shown that an LDC that pegs to the 
dollar will experience fluctuations in its effective exchange rate. 
If this is considered an undesirable development, the authorities can 
stabilize the effective rate by computing the weighted average of
exchange rates of the trading partners and by making the appropriate 
change in the value of the domestic currency vis-a-vis the dollar. 
This is a policy of managed float, requiring the sale or purchase of 
dollars in the currency market so to maintain the effective rate at a 
predetermined level (Table 2 provides an illustration.). A second 
arrangement designed to stabilize the effective rate, is to peg the
domestic currency to a basket of currencies such as the SDR. This
policy is designed to keep the value of the domestic currency at 
specified levels with respect to the SDR. However, since the SDR
itself is not a currency but a form of international reserves 
exchanged only among central banks, the authorities would still have 
to rely on their dollar reserves to maintain the SDR value (See Table 
3 for an illustration.).
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Given an SDR peg, if the country's trade pattern does not 
approximate the weights of the currencies in the SDR basket, the 
country may still continue to experience fluctuations in its effective 
rate. This means that the authorities would still be required to rely 
on their dollar reserves to keep the SDR value at the appropriate 
level and to keep the effective rate stable (Table 4 provides an 
illustration.).
Theoretically, the need for reserves can be avoided if the LDC
allows the value of its currency to fluctuate freely in the foreign
exchange market. This would free the authorities form the burden of
relying on reserves to maintain the value of the currency at some
specified level, particularly if it is at an over-valued level.
Empirically, there have been no studies to determine how each
of these arrangements will influence the reserves of the country.
Stanley Black has argued that a single currency peg would tend to lead
to larger payments imbalances and thus greater reserve needs, than an
21
appropriate basket peg. Similarly, Crockett and Nsouli have argued 
that a major drawback of a single currency peg in a world of floating 
exchange rates is increased reserve needs due to the greater variabil­
ity of the balance of payments induced by inappropriate exchange rate 
changes. The need for reserves would be reduced by pegging to a
basket of currencies that would stabilize the effective exchange 
22
rate. No studies have been carried out to confirm these arguments,
^Stanley Black, (1976). 
^Crockett and Nsouli, (1977).
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although studies have been performed to determine whether the floating
of major currencies has increased the variability of reserve use by
LDCs. In a study by Williamson, the results indicated that this
23
increased variability was trivial. In a study by Kafka, the
variability of reserves for LDCs that pegged to the dollar and those
that had other exchange rate arrangements was measured during the
periods of fixed and floating exchange rates. The results indicated
that the variability increased slightly for all the LDCs during the
floating period, with LDCs that pegged to the dollar experiencing
24
relatively lower variability.
The need for reserves depends on the value of the exchange 
rates that would prevail under a particular policy. . The countries in 
this study fixed the value of their currencies to the dollar and 
maintained that value by relying on their dollar reserves. Each 
maintained an over-valued currency and at some point in time devalued 
their currencies. As an alternative policy the authorities could have 
allowed their currencies to depreciate and thus have relieved them­
selves of the burden of relying on reserves to keep the value of the 
currency fixed. For example, Egypt maintained the value of the pound 
at $2.5556 from March 1973 to December 1978, and finally in January of 
1979 devalued the pound to $1.4286. Alternatively, had the value of
23John Williamson, "Generalized Floating and the Reserve Needs 
of Developing Countries," Danny Leipziger, The International Monetary 
System and Developing Nations, A.I.D. Washington, D.C., 1976, pp.
75-86.
2 ^
Alexander Kafka, "The New Exchange Rate Regime and the 
Developing Countries," The Journal of Finance, Papers and Proceedings, 
Volume 33, No. 3, June 1978, pp. 795-802.
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the pound been left to the forces of supply and demand In the market, 
It presumably would have depreciated to $1.4286 or a value in that 
range. If we assume that the value of the pound would have depreci­
ated proportionally over this period of time (i.e., seventy months), 
it is possible to simulate the monthly movements in the exchange value 
of the pound with respect to the dollar from March 1973 to December 
1978.
The simplest formula for calculating these hypothetical monthly 
exchange rates is:
RHYPUSP = RUSP. - ((RUSP. - RUSP„)(PER10D/N)).1 I N
where
RHYPUSP = simulated hypothetical market exchange rate
RUSP^ = the initial dollar-exchange rate
RUSP^ = the dollar-exchange rate following the devaluation
PERIOD = the month of analysis
N = total number of months
For example, RHYPUSP of the Egyptian pound for April 197 3, 
given RUSPj = $2.5556, RUSPN = $1.4286, PERIOD = 2, and N = 70, is 
2.5234. In this way hypothetical market exchange rates (RHYPUSPs) can 
be computed for all the months within the specified period of analy­
sis. The RHYPUSPs can then be compared to the other exchange rates 
that would prevail under the policies of 1) a dollar peg; 2) an SDR 
peg; and 3) the policy of keeping the effective rate constant when the 
domestic currency is pegged either to the dollar or to the SDR.
Continuing with the case of Egypt let us define:
RUSP = the existing dollar-pound rate under a dollar peg.
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RUSPSDR = the hypothetical dollar-pound rate that would be 
necessary to keep the value of the pound fixed at a 
predetermined SDR rate.
RHUSER = the hypothetical dollar-pound rate that would be
necessary to keep the effective rate constant at some 
specified value.
RHSDRER = the hypothetical dollar-pound rate that would be 
necessary to keep the effective rate constant at some
specified value, when the pound is pegged to the SDR.
Under a fixed exchange rate policy, the authorities must rely 
on their foreign exchange reserves to keep RUSP at some specified 
level. If RUSP is over valued, the authorities may eventually deplete 
their reserves and be forced to devalue the currency or to rely upon a 
system of trade and payment controls. On the other hand, they could 
let the currency float, and allow it to depreciate to a new equili­
brium level. Through time, the difference between RUSP and RHYPUSP 
will increase, reaching a maximum at the period when the authorities 
finally devalue the currency. Assuming that reserve use is more or 
less proportional to the difference between RUSP and RHYPUSP, this
difference will then give us an indication of the amount of reserve
that would be necessary to keep RUSP fixed.
Similarly, under a policy of keeping the effective rate con­
stant, the authorities must continuously adjust the value of the 
domestic currency vis-a-vis the dollar (RHUSER) through intervening in 
the market by buying and selling dollars. The extent of the changes 
in reserves required for this purpose is reflected in the difference 
between RHUSER and RHYPUSP. The difference between RUSPSDR and 
RHYPUSP provide us with the same type of information when the author­
ities decide to peg to the SDR, and the the difference between RHSDRER 
and RHYPUSP indicate the changes in reserves that would be necessary
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when the authorities decide to keep the effective rate constant under 
an SDR peg.
We can then measure the variance of these differences between 
the various rates to give us an indication of the extent of changes in 
reserves that would result under each exchange rate arrangement. For 
each exchange rate arrangement, let us define each difference as: 
RDIFF1 = RUSP-RHYPUSP 
RDIFF2 = RHUSER-RHYPUSP 
RDIFF3 = RUSPSDR-RHYPUSP 
RDIFF4 = RHSDRER-RHYPUSP 
For each country, monthly RHYPUSPs were calculated for a specified 
period starting with March 1973 and ending in the period when a 
devaluation of the currency occurred. Similar periodic calculations 
were made to estimate RHUSER, RUSPSDR, and RHSDRER. Next the differ­
ences (RDlFFs) were calculated, and then means and standard deviations 
were measured with the results presented in Table 10. (Also see 
Appendix B and Appendix C.)
For Egypt, no single RDIFF displayed a different variance. 
RDIFF1 had a mean of 0.5717 and a standard deviation of 0.3277. If 
Egypt decided to stabilize the effective rate, it would be able to 
reduce the mean of RDIFF2 to 0.4148, but increase the standard 
deviation to 0.4349. The mean and standard deviation for RDIFF3, 
which was pegging the pound to the SDR, were close to the mean and
TABLE 10
RDIFF1
Variance of RDIFFs 
RDIFF2 RDIFF3 RDIFF4
Egypt 
March 73- 
Dec. 78
Ghana 
March 73- 
June 78
Burundi 
March 73- 
April 76
Pakistan 
March 73- 
Dec. 81
Somalia 
March 73- 
April 82
Sudan 
March 73- 
May 78
Means
.5717
.2568
,0008
.0082
.0477
,1887
Standard
Deviation
.3277
.1471
.00046
.0047
.0274
.1081
Mean
.4148*
.1539*
.0009
.0071
-.0525*
-.5845*
Standard
Deviation Mean
.4349*
,2035*
.00339*
.0107*
.0343*
,7339*
.5591
.2473
.0007
,0086
.0482
.1530*
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard
Deviation
.3506
.1438
.00044
,0071*
.0299
1063
.4270* .2987
.1664*
.0012
,0908
.00267*
.0054* .0069*
-.0567* .0322*
-.5099* .5728*
(*) Asterisk indicates 95 percent level of significance. See Footnote 25.
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standard deviation for RDIFF2. RDIFF4 displayed a lower mean than 
RDIFF1 and RDIFF3, and the lowest standard deviation.
In the case of Sudan, RDIFF2 and RDIFF4 displayed relatively 
higher standard deviations than RDIFF1 and RDIFF3. RDIFF1 and RDIFF3 
had similar means and standard deviations. Burundi displayed similar 
means and standard deviation for RDIFF1 and RDIFF3. The highest 
standard deviation belonged to RDIFF2, while the lowest was associated 
with RDIFF4.
For Somalia, all RDIFFs had approximately equal standard 
deviations. Finally, in the case of Pakistan, only RDIFF2 had a 
different standard deviation than the other RDIFFs, and RDIFF1 and 
RDIFF3 had equal but relatively higher means and standard deviations 
than RD1FF2 and RDIFF4.
Based on the results obtained, each exchange rate arrangement 
yields a different pattern of dollar exchange rates. Yet the differ­
ence between these rates and the hypothetical market exchange rate are 
not of great significance, as reflected in the negligible difference 
in the means and standard deviations of the RDIFFs. This implies that 
we cannot infer that the level of reserves and the associated economic 
costs will be much different under the alternative arrangements. We 
are, therefore, unable to make any strong generalizations about the 
appropriateness of a particular exchange rate arrangement, in terms of 
the cost of maintaining and using international reserves.
By looking at the actual level of reserves (Table 11) it is 
difficult to determine whether reserve use has significantly changed
The test of the difference between the means and standard 
deviations of RDIFF1 and RDIFF2, RDIFF1 and RDIFF3, RDIFFl and RIDFF4.
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following the floating of major currencies. This is because the 
authorities in these countries use other instruments, such as capital 
controls, import quotas, and exchange controls to maintain their 
dollar peg. In addition, many countries hold reserves for the purpose 
of financing development projects or servicing their foreign debt, it
is thus difficult to gather information on the absolute extent of
reserves that these countries hold for intervention 
TABLE 11 
RESERVES
purposes.
Standard
Means Deviation
Somalia 59.32 42.58
Ghana 149.18 59.32
Sudan 32.32 19.45
Burundi 17.57 5.35
Pakistan 457.34 K3 ro 00
Isxpt 307.37 132.46
As was demonstrated earlier, a policy of pegging to the SDR (as 
opposed to pegging to the dollar) reduces the variance in the effec­
tive exchange rate of each of the countries in the study. Yet they 
will still continue to experience fluctuations in their effective 
exchange rate. If the objective is to stabilize the effective 
exchange rate, then they must adjust their domestic currency value 
with respect to the dollar. Whether or not this will result in the 
need for more or fewer dollar reserves is not evident given the 
results of this study.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The introduction of generalized floating of major currencies 
has presented the LDCs with a number of policy options. One option, 
currently pursued by many LDCs, is pegging to a single currency, 
particularly the dollar. Yet pegging to a major currency, under 
generalized floating, is not a continuation of the exchange rate 
policy under the previous system of fixed exchange rates. Since the 
dollar is a fluctuating currency, the LDC will peg to a more variable 
standard, and as a result, much of the variation in the LDC's exchange 
rate will be caused by factors primarily external to the LDC itself. 
These variations in the LDC's exchange rate cannot be directly ob­
served if one looks at the LDC's nominal exchange rate since the 
domestic value of the currency with respect to the major currency is 
fixed.
To determine what happens to an LDC's exchange rate, a weighted 
average of all the changes in the exchange rates of the LDC's trading 
partners is required. Such an average is called the effective ex­
change rate. In calculating the index, a weight representing the 
comparative importance to the LDC of each foreign country is applied 
to the value, relative to a chosen base period, of the exchange rate 
between the foreign currency and the LDC currency.
If the LDC's preference is to maintain a stable exchange rate, 
then it may adopt a policy of stabilizing the effective exchange rate.
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Movements in the effective exchange rate depend on the degree of the 
diversification of the country's trade pattern, and the standard to 
which it pegs. If the majority of the country's trade is carried out 
with the U.S., then movements in the exchange rates of other 
currencies will exert little influence on the effective exchange rate. 
Consequently, stabilizing the dollar exchange rate will also stabilize 
the effective rate. On the other hand, if the LDC trades with several 
developed countries then the floating of these currencies will cause 
movements in the LDC's effective rate. To offset these exogenous 
changes the LDC can peg its currency to a standard which is composed 
of a basket of currencies which includes the currencies of its major 
trading partners. One such basket is the SDR basket which includes 
the currencies of five industrial countries. It has been suggested 
that the SDR is an appropriate basket for many LDCs since the majority 
of their trade is carried out with these five countries.
If the currency composition of the SDR does not approximate the 
LDC's trade pattern, then the LDC may continue to experience movements 
in its effective exchange rate, although the magnitude and variance of 
these movements may be smaller than those under the dollar peg.
Four exchange rate arrangements are then considered in this 
study. First, a policy of continuing to peg the domestic currency to 
the dollar by intervening in the foreign exchange market. Second, a 
policy of stabilizing the effective exchange rate by changing the 
value of the domestic currency vis-a-vis the dollar. Third, pegging 
the currency to the SDR, by managing the value of the currency with 
respect to the dollar. Fourth, stabilizing the effective exchange
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rate under an SDR peg through intervention in the foreign exchange 
market.
Each of these arrangements will require foreign exchange 
reserves in order to manage the value of the domestic currency with 
respect to the dollar. The extent of these dollar reserves and the 
associated cost of maintaining them is an element that must be taken 
into consideration when deciding upon the appropriateness of each 
policy. The extent of dollar reserves will depend on the difference 
between the exchange values of the currency under each arrangements, 
and the market exchange rate that would prevail if the LDC allowed its 
currency to float independently. The assumption is that the larger
the difference between the two rates, the larger the amount of
reserves required.
This study has attempted to investigate these points both 
theoretically and empirically. The first part of the study explained 
the concept of the effective exchange rate and illustrated movements 
in the index under a dollar peg and an SDR peg. It then showed the
implications of stabilizing the effective exchange rate index, in
terms of the changes in the dollar value of the domestic currency.
Based on the analysis in the first part, the second section of 
the study involved constructing a more comprehensive and accurate 
index of actual effective exchange rates for six LDCs. Movements in 
the index were compared under a dollar peg and an SDR peg for each 
country. The results indicated that all six countries experienced 
movements in their effective exchange rates during the period of 
generalized floating. These movements could have been reduced had 
these countries pegged their currencies to the SDR during that period.
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The results confirmed the hypothesis that countries with a diversified 
trade pattern can reduce the instability in their effective rates by 
switching from a single currency peg to a basket peg. The results 
also indicated that even with an SDR peg these countries continued to 
exhibit movements in their effective rates. This was because their 
trade pattern and the associated weights attached tc the currencies in 
their indices did not exactly match those of the SDR basket.
The final part of the study concentrated on the extent of 
reserves that would be necessary to achieve the objectives of each 
policy. As discussed earlier, the amount of reserves necessary 
dependent on the variance of the difference between the exchange rates 
that would emerge under the policies of pegging and stabilizing the 
effective rate, and the exchange rate that would result under a policy 
of independent floating. The results indicated no significant differ­
ence in the variances. This implied that no particular policy could 
be selected as the one requiring the least amount of reserves, since 
it was not possible to distinguish any significant difference in the 
variance of the exchange rates.
Based on the result obtained in this study, several points need 
to be made regarding the reaction of LDCs to the present system of 
generalized floating. First, LDCs must pay closer attention to the 
movements in their effective exchange rates, particularly if they 
trade with more than one major developed country. This involves 
developing more sophisticated indices of effective exchange rates, 
similar to the MERM-type index that the IMF calculates for the 
industrialized countries.
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Second, LDCs that have a diversified trade pattern and still 
prefer a policy of pegging their currencies to an appropriate 
standard, should consider the possibility of pegging to a basket of 
currencies. The basket could be a tailor-made basket or the SDR 
basket could be used. The results of the study showed that these LDCs 
could reduce the variance in their effective exchange rate indices by 
pegging to the SDR. An interesting extension of this study could 
attempt to observe the movements of the effective exchange rate 
indices of LDCs that have actually switched from a dollar peg to an 
SDR peg, and then compare the variance between the two policies over 
the appropriate periods.
Third, further consideration should be given to the adoption of 
a policy of independent floating by these LDCs. One of the advantages 
of independent floating is the reduction or elimination of the cost of 
holding reserves for intervention purposes. One of the aims of this 
study was to make a preliminary investigation of the amount of re­
serves that would be needed under each of these four policies. The 
technique involved estimating the changes in the dollar exchange rates 
that would be needed for intervention purposes. These rates could 
then be compared to the rate that would result under floating to 
determine the amount of reserves required. While it was not possible 
to arrive at any firm conclusions regarding the level of reserves, 
this first attempt demonstrated that the costs of reserve use are not 
obviously different under the various pegging arrangements. Further 
research is warranted to develop more sophisticated methods to esti­
mate the periodic hypothetical market exchange rates when these LDCs 
allow their currencies to float. This would allow us to get a more
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accurate measure of the size of the differences in the exchange rates 
and hence give us a better indication of the needed reserves.
Many LDCs continue to evaluate the impact of floating rates on 
their economies. Some are experimenting with various forms of peg­
ging, while some have adopted policies of managed floating. This 
study has been a further attempt at presenting and analyzing the 
impact of floating on the exchange rate of a particular group of LDCs 
and at illustrating the implications of adopting different exchange 
rate arrangements by these LDCs. It is hoped that it is a further 
step towards resolving the problems faced by these countries.
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APPENDIX A
MOVEMENTS IN THE EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE INDEX UNDER A DOLLAR 
PEG (ERI) AND AN SDR PEG (ERISDR)
51
52
1973
197 A
1975
EGYPTIAN POUND
March 1973-December 1978
March 1973=100
DOLLAR PEG SDR PEG DOLLAR PEG SDR PEG
PERIOD (ERI) (ERISDR)_______ PERIOD______(ERI) (ERISDR)
3 1 0 0 .00 10 0 .00 1976 1 105.16 101 .88
4 100.23 100.23 2 105.27 101.99
5 98.49 98.49 3 107.61 103.15
6 95.18 95.18 4 108.99 103.97
7 94.95 94.95 5 109.33 103.52
8 96.35 96.35 6 108.94 103.50
9 95.90 95.90 7 109.04 103.67
10 96.17 96.17 8 108.93 103.91
11 99.87 99.87 9 109.16 104.70
12 101.42 101.42 10 109.94 105.23
11 109.70 104.56
1 105.24 105.24 12 108.94 104.92
2 102.69 105.24
3 10 0 .12 100 .12 1977 1 109.39 104.49
4 101.31 101.31 2 109.04 104.49
5 101.39 101.39 3 108.73 104.47
6 102.71 102.42 4 108.44 104.47
7 103.16 101.30 5 108.36 104.34
8 103.45 101.67 6 107.73 104.11
9 102.87 101.23 7 106.29 103.83
10 102.36 101.41 8 107.32 103.37
11 101.36 101.41 9 107.10 103.30
12 99.79 101.28 10 105.28 103.30
11 104.99 102.99
1 98.41 101.04 12 102.49 103.20
2 96.71 101.06
3 97.62 100.95 1978 1 102.36 103.11
4 97.88 100.73 2 101.51 103.22
5 97.27 100.54 3 100.60 103.13
6 98.12 100.56 4 101.53 103.19
7 102.07 100.77 5 101.89 103.03
8 102.50 100.85 6 100.09 102.85
9 104.47 100.83 7 98.10 102.45
10 102.64 100.89 8 97.33 102.53
11 104.05 1 0 1 .00 9 96.40 102.38
12 104.10 101.02 10 91.51 102.32
11 97.55 102.89
12 91.67 99.00
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1973
1974
1975
1976
PAKISTANI RUPEE 
March 1973-December 1981 
March 1973=100 
DOLLAR PEG SDR PEG DOLLAR PEG SDR PEG
ERIOD (ERI) (ERISDR) PERIOD (ERI) (ERISDR)
3 10 0 .0 0 1 0 0 .00 1977 1 107.45 102.64
4 100.05 100.05 2 106.96 102.50
5 99.06 99.06 3 106.50 102.34
6 97.53 97.54 4 106.38 102.50
7 97.48 97.48 5 106.34 102.40
8 98.34 98.34 6 105.53 102.00
9 98.27 98.27 7 105.01 101.98
10 99.39 99.39 8 105.25 101.37
11 101.01 101.01 9 105.03 101.31
12 104.74 101.74 10 103.09 100.84
11 102.73 100.78
1 104.41 104.41 12 100.99 101.70
2 102.66 102 .66
3 10 0 .68 100.68 1978 1 100.87 101.61
4 100.70 100.70 2 100.35 102.05
5 101.48 101.48 3 99.26 101.76
6 101.65 101.65 4 99.78 101.42
7 103.56 103.28 5 100.01 101.14
8 103.42 101.56 6 97.90 100.60
9 103.20 101.57 7 95.86 10 0 .12
10 103.03 102.07 8 95.45 100.47
11 10 2 .66 102 .66 9 94.88 100.76
12 102.89 103.42 10 91.46 102.26
11 96.06 101.33
1 101.04 103.77 12 92.87 100.30
2 99.61 104.08
3 100.43 103.86 1979 1 95.52 101.79
4 10 0 .68 103.62 2 95.40 101.96
5 100.43 103.81 3 95.86 102.27
6 101.37 103.91 4 97.24 102.59
7 103.35 103.28 5 97.18 102.23
8 103.67 101.56 6 95.82 102.56
9 105.00 101.57 7 95.19 102.62
1 0.. 104.03 102.07 8 95.47 102.92
11 104.90 101.84 9 95.21 104.01
12 105.00 101.90 10 97.63 104.06
11 97.08 105.27
1 105.36 101.90 12 96.15 105.01
2 105.35 101.99
3 106.55 103.15 1980 1 102.36 104.73
4 107.38 102.43 2 101.51 104.98
5 107.86 102.15 3 100.60 103.15
6 107.49 102.13 4 101.53 103.92
7 107.49 102.02 5 101.89 104.02
8 107.03 102.11 6 100.09 103.57
9 107.41 103.03 7 98.10 103.74
10 108.34 103.71 8 97.33 103.24
11 108.17 103.11 9 96.40 102.66
12 107.46 103.51 10 91.51 101.59
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PAKISTANI RUPEE (Cont'd)
11 97.55 101.64
12 91.67 100.58
1 96.81 99.85
2 98.35 99.73
3 98.29 10 0 .10
4 100.26 99.62
5 102.46 99.42
6 103.94 99.15
7 106.19 99.23
8 105.16 98.75
9 104.89 99.53
10 104.63 99.85
11 101.84 99.68
12 102.93 99.32
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1973
1974
1975
SUDANESE POUND
March 1973-May 1978
March 1973=100
ERIOD
DOLLAR PEG 
(ERI)
SDR PEG 
(ERISDR) PERIOD
DOLLAR PEG 
(ERI)
SDR PEG 
(ERISDR)
3 100 .00 100 .0 0 1976 1 108.99 105.59
4 100.41 100.41 2 109.05 105.65
5 98.11 98.11 3 112.13 107.48
6 94.78 94.78 4 114.16 108.89
7 95.07 95.07 5 115.97 109.81
8 97.01 97.01 6 115.30 109.54
9 97.00 97.00 7 115.30 109.57
10 97.01 97.01 8 115.20 109.89
11 101.32 101.32 9 116.70 111.94
12 102.92 102.92 10 118.60 113.52
11 117.67 112.15
1 106.66 106.66 12 115.94 111.66
2 104.00 104.00
3 100.69 100.69 1977 1 116.21 111.01
4 100.10 100 .10 2 115.85 111.01
5 101.65 101.65 3 115.32 110.81
6 101.80 101.80 4 115.03 110.82
7 105.54 105.54 5 114.98 110.72
8 103.74 101.87 6 114.25 110.42
9 103.89 102.23 7 113.16 109.89
10 103.32 102.35 8 113.51 109.33
11 102.42 102.47 9 113.21 109.19
12 100.82 102.33 10 110.09 107.68
11 109.97 107.88
1 99.27 101.94 12 106.26 107.00
2 97.22 101.57
3 98.32 101.67 1978 1 105.61 106.38
4 99.14 102.03 2 104.93 106.70
5 99.03 102.35 3 104.99 107.63
6 100.98 103.50 4 106.19 107.93
7 105.16 103.82 5 106.71 107.90
8 104.25 104.25
9 108.60 104.81
10 106.44 104.63 , %
11 108.51 105.33
12 108.47 105.26
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1973
1974
1975
GHANAIAN CEDI 
March 1973-June 1978 
March 1973=100
DOLLAR PEG SDR PEG DOLLAR PEG SDR PEG
PERIOD (ERI) (ERISDR)_______ PERIOD______(ERI) (ERISDR)
3 100.00 1 0 0 .00 1976 1 107.24 103.89
4 99.98 99.98 2 107.28 103.93
5 98.20 98.20 3 109.66 105.11
6 95.78 95.78 4 111.39 106.25
7 96.06 96.06 5 112.92 106.92
8 97.49 97.49 6 112.36 106.74
9 97.62 97.62 7 112 .1 0 106.57
10 97.59 97.59 8 112.11 106.94
11 100.83 100.83 9 113.46 108.82
12 101.89 101.89 10 114.96 110.03
11 114.11 108.76
1 104.34 104.34 12 112 .68 108.51
2 102.58 102.58
3 99.91 99.91 1977 1 112.90 107.84
4 99.20 99.20 2 112.60 107.95
5 100.46 100.46 3 112.28 107.88
6 100 .68 100 .68 4 112.05 107.94
7 104.65 103.76 5 112.03 107.88
8 102.14 100.30 6 111.56 107.82
9 102.44 100.81 7 110.71 107.51
10 102.01 101.05 8 110.95 106.85
11 101.35 101.40 9 110.71 106.78
12 100.25 101.74 10 108.25 105.88
11 108.21 106.15
1 99.11 101.78 12 103.17 106.00
2 97.65 102 .02
3 98.48 101.84 1978 1 104.63 105.39
4 99.34 102.23 2 104.07 105.82
5 99.44 102.77 3 104.65 107.27
6 101.17 103.68 4 105.63 107.35
7 104.20 102 .8 6 5 106.08 107.26
8 104.86 103.17 6 104.46 107.33
9 106.89 103.15
-it) 105.33 103.53
11 106.94 103.81
12 106.85 103.69
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BURUNDI FRANC
March 1973-April 1976
March 1973=100
DOLLAR PEG SDR PEG
PERIOD (ERI) (ERISDR) PERIOD
DOLLAR PEG 
(ERI)
1973
1974
1975
3 10 0 .00 100 .0 0
4 100.27 100.05
5 98.06 97.89
6 93.57 93.36
7 93.15 92.94
8 95.46 95.26
9 94.77 94.56
10 95.08 94.87
11 99.76 99.54
12 101.87 101.65
1 106.81 106.57
2 103.14 102.91
3 100 .02 99.79
4 100.08 99.86
5 101.51 101.29
6 101.51 101.29
7 103.07 102.55
8 104.07 101.97
9 103.40 101.53
10 102.63 101.44
11 101.32 101.14
12 99.40 100.66
1 97.61 100.02
2 95.15 99.19
3 96.54 99.61
4 96.63 99.22
5 95.75 98.75
6 96.66 98.85
7 101,45 99.93
8 101.92 100.06
9 104.30 100.44
10 101.90 99.94
11 103.66 100.40
12 103.86 100.56
1976 1
2
3
4
104.10
103.97
105.80
106.60
SDR PEG 
(ERISDR) 
100.63 
100.50 
101.19 
101.45
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DOLLAR PEG 
PERIOD (ERI)
SOMALIAN SHILLING 
March 1973-April 1982 
March 1973=100 
SDR PEG DOLLAR PEG SDR PEG
(ERISDR) PERIOD (ERI) (ERISDR)
1973
1974
1975
1976
3 100 .0 0 100.00 1977 1 129.88 124.65
4 100.79 100.79 2 129.86 125.03
5 99.27 99.27 3 129.89 125.52
6 97.54 97.54 4 129.67 125.36
7 97.70 97.70 5 129.57 125.45
8 96.98 96.98 6 129.20 125.28
9 96.75 96.75 7 128.40 124.47
10 97.35 97.35 8 128.63 124.52
11 101.95 101.95 9 128.50 124.63
12 103.18 103.18 10 126.82 124.83
11 126.65 125.75
1 109.27 109.27 12 124.30 125.13
2 106.90 106.90
3 103.37 103.37 1978 1 123.64 124.91
4 103.88 103.88 2 122.26 125.99
5 105.63 105.63 3 122.32 126.64
6 105.98 105.98 4 124.02 126.25
7 107.41 106.55 5 124.26 126.13
8 106.86 105.43 6 122.35 126.41
9 106.91 105.70 7 120.09 126.01
10 107.91 106.69 8 119.10 126.06
11 106.49 107.14 9 117.59 125.46
12 104.49 106.55 10 112.01 125.83
11 120.13 127.31
1 103.00 106.28 12 114.70 124.45
2 101.53 106.58
3 101.95 105.93 1979 1 119.43 126.79
4 102.44 105.92 2 119.09 126.79
5 101.72 105.63 3 117.95 126.41
6 102.98 106.04 4 119.15 126.30
7 107.85 106.98 5 119.70 126.51
8 108.46 107.23 6 116.73 125.53
9 111.17 107.80 7 114.95 124.50
10 109149 108.13 8 114.71 124.23
11 11 0 .88 108.14 9 113.19 124.23
12 110.77 108.00 10 117.37 125.69
11 114.46 124.70
1 116.47 113.37 12 113.21 124.21
2 117.73 114.60
3 124.82 120.21 1980 1 113.30 124.16
4 130.05 124.63 2 114.71 124.56
5 126.92 120.75 3 122.98 128.15
6 126.36 120.62 4 116.95 126.11
7 125.93 120.30 5 116.17 126.88
8 126.36 121 .11 6 114.84 126.67
9 128.42 123.76 7 115.61 126.33
10 129.58 124.62 8 116.12 127.20
11 129.25 123.78 9 116.82 127.70
12 129.97 124.97 10 120.30 129.25
11
12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1
2
3
4
59
SOMALIAN SHILLING (Cont'd)
122.14 129.87
123.10 130.77
129.80 134.50
133.22 135.73
134.26 137.38
140.16 139.92
145.94 142.27
150.31 144.40
154.46 145.01
153.62 144.93
150.46 143.43
151.19 144.96
147.69 145.24
150.25 145.66
153.94 147.16
158.58 148.84
162.38 150.53
159.52 150.09
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MARCH 1973-DECEM IIEE 197(1
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APPENDIX B
MOVEMENTS IN THE HYPOTHETICAL EXCHANGE RATES UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
EXCHANGE RATE ARRANGEMENTS 
(RHYPUSP.RHUSER, RUSPSDR, RHSDRER)
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APPENDIX C
MOVEMENTS IN THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE HYPOTHETICAL EXCHANGE 
RATES UNDER VARIOUS PEGGING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE HYPOTHETICAL 
MARKET EXCHANGE RATE. (RDIFF1, RDIFF2, RDIFF3, RDIFF4)
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